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RIGHTING THE NOTICE PLEADING SHIP: HOW ERICKSON V.
PARDUS SOLIDIFIES THE MODERN SUPREME COURT TREND OF




Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,
the Supreme Court has followed a trend that has "restrict[ed] the pleadings
to the task of general notice-giving."' "General notice-giving" is simply the
plaintiff giving the defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests," usually in the complaint itself.2 In the
summer of 2007, the Supreme Court decided two separate cases involving
the notice pleading standard under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 3 It is these two cases, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly4 and
Erickson v. Pardus,5 that this Comment focuses on. Specifically, this
Comment focuses on the implication of the holding of Erickson and its
effect on the holding in Twombly.
In Twombly, the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for
failure to meet the notice pleading standard of 8(a)(2) on an action for li-
ability under § 1 of the Sherman Act.6 However, in dismissing the com-
plaint, the Court specifically noted that it did not wish to "apply any
* J.D. Candidate 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author is grateful to Professor Gary
Laser and Rachel Moran for their helpful comments and insight in writing this Note.
1. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
2. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
3. "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief must contain... a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)(2009).
4. 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007).
5. 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007).
6. 127 S.Ct. at 1961. § I of the Sherman Act can be found at 15 U.S.C.§ 1, and it provides that:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
Id.
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heightened pleading standard, nor... seek to broaden the scope of
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 9, which can only be accomplished
by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpre-
tation." 7
In contrast, Erickson involved the complaint of a pro se prisoner who
sparsely alleged that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by taking him off of his hepatitis C medication. 8 The Supreme Court over-
ruled the decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had dis-
missed the petitioner's complaint for failure to state a claim, and held that
the petitioner's complaint was sufficient under the simple notice pleading
standard established by Rule 8(a)(2). 9 While some academics felt that the
Twombly decision "signal[ed] the rejection of notice pleading," and that
"the Court [was] saying that Rule 8 requires 'notice-plus' pleading," the
timing and straightforward nature of the Erickson decision suggests that the
Court did not intend for Twombly to alter the trend of general notice plead-
ing that the Court has followed since the creation of the Federal Rules. 10
Part I of this Comment traces the history of pleading in the United
States from the development of what was known as Field Code Pleading to
the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938. Part II focuses on how the courts
implemented the newly enacted Federal Rules until the Conley v. Gibson
decision in 1957.11 Part III continues this historical examination from 1957
through the Twombly and Erickson decisions in the summer of 2007.
Part IV first examines the Twombly decision and its effects on the
trend the Supreme Court has established over the last half-century concern-
ing the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2). This Comment suggests
that the Twombly Court effectively created a heightened pleading standard
for antitrust cases, even though it specifically denied doing so. Part IV then
analyzes the Erickson decision and how the timing and direct nature of
Erickson suggest that the Court's decision in Twombly does not extend
beyond Twombly itself. Ultimately, Part V of this Comment argues that
while Twombly departed from the modern trend of simple notice pleading
in response to concerns with the ever-increasing costs of discovery in fed-
7. Id. at 1973 n. 14 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
8. 127 S.Ct. at 2197.
9. Id. at 219 8 .
10. Amy Howe, More on Yesterday's Decision in No. 06-7317, Erickson v. Pardus, ScoTs
BLOG, June 5, 2007, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/more-on-yesterdays-decision-in-no-
06-7317-erickson-v-pardus/#more-5535.
11. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) is significant because it was one of the first Supreme
Court cases to establish the new pleading standard as "notice pleading." Twombly also later abrogated
specific language in Conley, causing some to believe that Twombly signaled the end of the notice
pleading trend the Supreme Court seemed to be following after the Conley decision.
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eral litigation, Erickson demonstrates the Court's desire to isolate Twombly
as an outlier and reinforce the modem trend in which Rule 8(a)(2) does not
require a heightened pleading standard.
I. FROM FIELD CODE PLEADING TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
The Code of Civil Procedure in New York in 1848 marked the begin-
ning of what was known as "Field Code Pleading" in the United States. 12
This reform was led by New York attorney David Dudley Field, whose
goal was to branch out from the common law system adopted from the
English model of pleadings by creating a system in which there was "but
one form of action."'13 Pleadings under this system began with a complaint,
which only needed to contain a concise statement of the facts alleging the
cause of action in such a way that the receiver of the complaint would un-
derstand the plaintiff s intentions. 14 Similarly, the answer was limited to "a
specific denial of each material allegation of the complaint controverted by
the defendant" and "a plain concise statement of any new matter constitut-
ing a defense or set-off without unnecessary repetition." 15 And, under this
system, pleadings were limited to a complaint, an answer, a reply, and a
demurrer. 
16
However, Field Code Pleading, also known as fact pleading, created
many problems for lawyers and courts. Courts often had difficulty reading
complaints and determining what could be qualified as evidence, facts, or
mere conclusions. 17 For example, the North Carolina Supreme Court in
Gillispie v. Goodyear Service Stores18 granted a defendant's demurrer on
the basis that the plaintiffs complaint asserted mere conclusions rather
than ultimate facts. 19 While the Gillispie Court found that the plaintiffs
complaint failed to allege "what occurred, when it occurred, where it oc-
curred, who did what, [or] the relationships between defendants and plain-
tiff," it could be argued that the plaintiff alleged enough in the complaint, if
read liberally, to constitute all of the elements of the various causes of ac-
12. RICHARD L. MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A




16. Id. Today, the function of the demurrer has been replaced by the surreply; in other words, a
reply to the plaintiff s reply.
17. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1218, at 265 (3d ed. 2004).
18. 128 S.E.2d 762 (N.C. 1963).
19. Id.
20091
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tion.20 Therefore, courts following the Field Code Pleading System often
had problems distinguishing between complaints that appropriately pled
"ultimate facts" and those that only pled "conclusions" or "mere evi-
dence." 21
Although the Gillispie case was decided in 1963, it is a prototypical
example of how courts handled the pleading standard under the Field Code
system before a committee headed by Yale Law School Dean Charles
Clark drafted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.22 Historically,
the pleading system had served four functions: (1) providing notice of the
nature of the claim or defense, (2) stating the facts that the parties believed
to exist, (3) narrowing the issues to be litigated, and (4) providing a means
for speedy disposition of sham claims and insufficient defenses. 23 How-
ever, because of the difficulty courts had in drawing the lines between evi-
dence, facts, and conclusions, the drafters of the newly proposed federal
rules narrowed the purposes of pleading to just providing notice. 24 Clark
and the drafting committee thus favored what has been called a "liberal
ethos," where having a trial on the merits by a jury and full disclosure
through the use of liberal discovery procedures was preferred to the use of
exhaustive fact-laden pleadings. 25
To ensure that pleadings would not be as fact-intensive as they were
under Field Code Pleading, Rule 8(a)(2) only requires "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."' 26 The
drafters used these words to replace the language of the Field Code Plead-
ing system, which required "facts constituting a cause of action."'27 The
drafters of the federal rules intentionally avoided the terms "fact," "conclu-
sion," and "cause of action," in drafting Rule 8(a)(2) in order to distinguish
the new system from the most prominent feature of Field Code Pleading,
namely the distinction between "ultimate facts" and "conclusions. '28
In order to clarify exactly how "short and plain" the statement of the
claim needed to be under Rule 8(a)(2), the drafters prepared a series of
forms to serve as the basic outlines for complaints. 29 Some of these forms,
20. Id. at 766.
21. Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
86 COLUM. L. REv. 433 (1986).
22. MARCUS ETAL.,supra note 12, at 131.
23. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1202, at 87-88.
24. Id. § 1201, 84-87.
25. Marcus, supra note 21, at 439.
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
27. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1202, at 87.
28. Marcus, supra note 21, at 439.
29. Id.
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such as Form 11,30 were so simplistic that, for example, the allegation that
"defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff' would con-
stitute a well-pled allegation.3 1 The adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938
therefore left the courts somewhat confused; the courts had become accus-
tomed to the detail required under the old Field Code, fact pleading system,
but were now faced with a newly-developing system that focused only on
the notice pleading function served by the old system.
32
II. FROM THE FEDERAL RULES TO CONLEY v. GIBSON
The shift from Field Code pleading to the new notice pleading stan-
dard under the Federal Rules did not immediately affect how attorneys and
judges dealt with pleadings. 33 In fact, Charles Clark was later a judge for
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and wrote the opinion for Dioguardi
v. Durning, which saw the Second Circuit following the newly drafted
Federal Rules. 34 Dioguardi involved an "obviously home drawn" com-
plaint by an uneducated plaintiff, which the District Court of the United
States for the Southern District of New York dismissed for failure to state a
claim-as would have been required under the old Field Code System.
35
However, Clark overturned this decision, finding that the plaintiff had
stated enough to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because:
[u]nder the new rules of civil procedure, there is no pleading requirement
of stating "facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action," but only that
there be "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."
'36
Clark further chastised the District Court in noting that dismissal un-
der 12(b)(6) only based on the face of the complaint was an "instance of
judicial haste which in the long run makes waste."'37 The Second Circuit
therefore affirmed the presence of the new standard under the Federal
30. An example of a negligence pleading that would follow the requirements of Form 11 would
be: (1) This Court has jurisdiction over this matter; (2) On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called
Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff
who was then crossing said highway; (3) As a result plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg broken
and was otherwise injured, was prevented from transacting his business, suffered great pain of body and
mind, and incurred expenses for medical attention and hospitalization in the sum of one thousand
dollars., and (4) Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment against defendant in the sum of five thousand
dollars and costs. FED. R. Civ. P. FORM 11.
31. Marcus, supra note 21, at 439.
32. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1202, at 92-93.
33. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 12, at 132.
34. 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
35. Id. at 774.




Rules; and, even though the plaintiff in Dioguardi was inarticulate in stat-
ing his claims, the court could "not see how the plaintiff may properly be
deprived of his day in court to show what he obviously so firmly be-
lieves." 38
While some district courts continued to apply elements of the Field
Code Pleading System, the Supreme Court began a trend of overturning
district court decisions and formally accepting the new standard under the
Federal Rules. 39 It was not until 1947 that the Supreme Court first noted
that "the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact-
revelation were performed primarily and inadequately by the pleadings,"
and that the "new rules... restrict the pleadings to the task of general no-
tice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in
the preparation for trial."'40
By 1957, Supreme Court decisions seemed to accept the new notice
pleading standard under Rule 8(a)(2). 41 In Conley v. Gibson, the Court was
presented with a class action suit by African-American railway and steam-
ship workers alleging wrongful discharge by their employers and discrimi-
nation by their union under the Railway Labor Act.42 Specifically, the
workers claimed that the union did not help them protect their jobs, as the
union did with white employees, because they were African-Americans. 43
In reversing the decision of the lower court, the Supreme Court famously
stated that it would follow the rule that "a complaint should not be dis-
missed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would enti-
tle him to relief."44
Going further, the Court noted that the inclusion of illustrative forms
along with the Rules as prototypical examples of complaints for different
causes of action demonstrated that pleading is not "a game of skill in which
one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome," and that the Rules
"accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper
decision on the merits. '45 The Court also adopted the "liberal ethos"'46 of
the original drafters in applying this simplified notice pleading with an eye
38. Id.
39. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Nar-
cotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
40. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947).
41. Conley, 355 U.S. at 46.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 45-46.
45. Id. at 48.
46. Marcus, supra note 21, at 439.
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toward "liberal ... discovery and the other pretrial procedures established
by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of ... claim[s] ... and to
define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues."'47
Although Conley seemed to signal a clear adoption of notice pleading,
at least one academic believed that "Conley v. Gibson turned Rule 8 on its
head by holding that a claim is insufficient only if the insufficiency appears
from the pleading itself."48 In other words, a complaint would only be dis-
missed if the plaintiff failed to keep the complaint plain or short; compli-
ance with Conley would therefore only require "giving the names of the
plaintiff and the defendant, and asking for judgment. '49 However, the
Conley Court, in adopting the "short and plain statement of the claim"50
standard, was also clear that a complaint must state more than just the
names of the parties, which, while being plain and short, would not provide
"fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is,"'51 which Rule 8(a)(2) also re-
quires. Thus, Conley marked the beginning of a new Supreme Court trend
in which the Court clearly and directly followed the pleading standard of
Rule 8(a)(2) in overturning decisions of the lower courts and only requiring
the most basic notice for a complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss. 52
III. AFTER CONLEY V. GIBSON: THE MODERN SUPREME COURT TREND
In the thirty-five years following the decision in Conley v. Gibson, the
Court faced no significant challenges to the new notice pleading standard
that appeared to be firmly established under Rule 8(a)(2). In fact, the Court
usually dismissed any minor challenges to the new standard with a simple
reference to the language in Conley or to the idea of liberal discovery and
summary judgment procedures as alternative methods of defining facts and
issues.5
3
47. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48.
48. Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 1665, 1685
(1998).
49. Id.
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
51. Conley, 355 U.S. at47.
52. See id.
53. See Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 343 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Conley, 355
U.S. at 47-48) (disagreeing with the majority's insistence that a complaint by styled as a challenge
based on overbreadth because this would be "inconsistent with the liberal notice pleading philosophy
that informs the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)
(noting that the simplified notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) allows the summary judgment
process to fulfill the role of identifying factually insufficient claims); Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v.
Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-52 (1984) (holding that a Title VII claim for employment discrimination had
no heightened pleading standard and that the standard as stated in Conley only requires that the defen-
dant receive fair notice of the plaintiff's claims and the grounds upon which it rests); Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (finding that the notice pleading system does not limit
2009]
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In spite of this Supreme Court trend, some federal courts demonstrated
resistance to the minimal requirements of the new notice pleading standard.
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, for one,
opposed the notice pleading standard in affirming a Rule 12(b)(6) 54 dis-
missal in Sutliff Inc. v. Donovan Companies, Inc.55 Acknowledging the
relaxed pleading standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Conley, Judge
Posner stated that the standard
has never been taken literally. Professors Wright and Miller treat as au-
thoritative the statement in an earlier case that the pleader must "set out
sufficient factual matter to outline the elements of his cause of action or
claim, proof of which is essential to his recovery[.]" ... The heavy costs
of modem federal litigation. .. and the mounting caseload pressures on
the federal courts, counsel against launching the parties into pretrial dis-
covery if there is no reasonable prospect that the plaintiff can make out a
cause of action from the events narrated in the complaint. 56
Judge Posner thus believed that plaintiffs must set out the elements of
their claim beyond just a short plain statement of the claim, especially be-
cause the costs of litigation are so high that proceeding to discovery with-
out any indication of a legitimate complaint is ill-advised, even if discovery
is designed to uncover underlying facts and issues. 57
Similarly, Judge Michael Boudin of the First Circuit Court of Appeals
followed Judge Posner in resisting the standard established by Conley and
Rule 8(a)(2). 58 In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff manufacturer's
complaint alleging conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman
Act by a standards organization for imposing a certain standard for reagent
grade water, the First Circuit stated that:
the price of entry, even to discovery, is for a plaintiff to allege a factual
predicate concrete enough to warrant further proceedings, which may be
costly and burdensome. Conclusory allegations in a complaint, if they
stand alone, are a danger sign that plaintiff is engaging in a fishing expe-
dition. 59
Thus, while the First Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit in Sutliff, ac-
knowledged the existence of the Rule 8(a)(2) notice pleading standard, it
also noted that the standard requires more than minimal notice and must
discovery to issues raised by the pleadings because liberal discovery proceedings are designed to "de-
fine and clarify issues").
54. "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the
responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion... (6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
55. 727 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1984).
56. Id. at 654.
57. Id.
58. See DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1999).
59. Id.
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additionally provide sufficient facts to proceed to discovery so that the
plaintiff does not waste time and run up unnecessary expenses by engaging
in a "fishing expedition. ' '60
Even Judge Clark, reporter for the drafting committee of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the person generally credited with the idea of
notice pleading, did not necessarily believe that the new standard was a
complete departure from fact pleading.61 Clark acknowledged that a com-
plaint, even under a notice pleading standard, could not be too general or
conclusory and that "[a] bare allegation that the defendant had injured the
plaintiff through negligence.., would not suffice. ' 62 Thus, even under a
notice pleading standard, some judges and scholars believed that a com-
plaint containing unsupported, conclusory facts could not withstand a mo-
tion to dismiss.
Even with dissenters raising concerns in the lower federal courts, the
Supreme Court persisted in following the trend of simplified notice plead-
ing in requiring merely a "short and plain statement of the claim. '63 In
1993, the Court granted certiorari in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Nar-
cotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit64 to decide whether civil rights
cases required a "heightened pleading standard" under Rule 8(a)(2).
65
Leatherman arose out of two separate incidents involving officers
forcibly entering a home after noticing odors indicative of narcotic manu-
facturing, with one plaintiff alleging assault by the entering officers and the
other alleging that the entering officers had killed her dogs.66 Both the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas and the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the complaints under a heightened
pleading standard 67 for § 1983 claims, reasoning that the government was
entitled to specific factual details so that it could adequately prepare for a
likely defense of government immunity.
68
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the Fifth Circuit's heightened
60. Id.
61. Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85
YALE L.J. 914, 917-18 (1976).
62. Id.
63. FED R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
64. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
65. Id. at 164.
66. Id. at 164-65.
67. In Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit established a height-
ened pleading standard for § 1983 claims: "In cases involving governmental officials involving the
likely defense of immunity we require of trial judges that they demand that the plaintiff's complaints
state with factual detail and particularity the basis for claims which necessarily includes why the defen-
dant-official cannot successfully maintain the defense of immunity."
68. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167.
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pleading standard to be completely inconsistent with the "liberal system of
notice pleading set up by the Federal Rules."'69 Referencing Conley, the
Court noted that the Rules simply "do not require a claimant to set out in
detail the facts upon which he bases his claim, ' 70 except for in two specific
instances under Rule 9(b), which require particularity.71 Thus, the Court
held that neither Rule 8(a)(2) nor Rule 9(b) indicate any kind of heightened
pleading standard for § 1983 claims, and while either of the Rules could be
rewritten to add such a specificity requirement, doing so could only be
accomplished by amending the Federal Rules, not by judicial interpreta-
tion. 72 Until such an amendment occurred, the Court once again empha-
sized the federal courts' reliance upon liberal discovery and summary
judgment procedures in order to "weed out unmeritorious claims sooner
rather than later." 73
Similar to Leatherman, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. presented the
Court with the opportunity to accept a heightened pleading standard for
employment discrimination claims. 74 Petitioner Swierkiewicz alleged that
he had been wrongfully terminated because of his age and national origin;
however, both the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to adequately allege a prima facie cause of discrimina-
tion 75 as set forth under by the Supreme Court in McDonnel Douglas Corp.
v. Green.
76
Returning once again to the simplified notice pleading standard, the
Swierkiewicz Court held that "an employment discrimination complaint
need not include such [prima facie] facts and instead must contain only a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
69. Id. at 168 (internal quotations omitted).
70. Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957)).
71. "In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constitut-
ing fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged
generally." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
72. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
73. Id. at 168-69.
74. 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).
75. Id. at 509.
76. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The standard set forth by the Court in McDonnell Douglas is as
follows:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of establish-
ing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he be-
longs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek appli-
cants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
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relief. '77 Furthermore, the Court distinguished the McDonnel Douglas
standard as an evidentiary standard instead of a heightened pleading re-
quirement that a plaintiff must satisfy in order to survive a motion to dis-
miss. 78
The Court also indicated that requiring a plaintiff to plead facts under
an evidentiary standard would be a bad policy decision because the
McDonnel Douglas framework would not apply in every employment dis-
crimination case.79 Because it is possible for a plaintiff to prove direct evi-
dence of discrimination, he would not have to always plead the elements of
a prima facie case in order to succeed. 80 Therefore, the Court found it "in-
congruous to require a plaintiff, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, to
plead more facts than he may ultimately need to prove to succeed on the
merits if direct evidence of discrimination is discovered."
81
Like the Leatherman Court, the Swierkiewicz Court relied on liberal
discovery rules and summary judgment motions in making its decision to
strictly adhere to the Rule 8(a)(2) notice pleading standard and avoid a
heightened pleading standard for a specific cause of action.82 Under this
standard, the Court found that the plaintiffs complaint easily satisfied the
bare notice requirement without having to establish any type of prima facie
case for employment discrimination.83 At the same time, the Court noted
that Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard without any concern for the
merits of the claim, and that "it may appear on the face of the pleadings
that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test."
'84
Almost two months after the decision in Swierkiewicz, the Court was
put in a different position than it had been in its previous decisions when it
granted certiorari to decide whether a complaint should be dismissed after
having been deemed sufficient by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. 85 In Christopher v. Harbury, the plaintiff alleged that
Government officials had intentionally deceived her by concealing infor-
mation regarding the detainment and torture of her husband. 86 Ultimately,
the Court held that the complaint was insufficient because it failed to iden-
tify an underlying cause of action and, furthermore, the complaint did not
77. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508.
78. Id. at510-12.
79. Id. at 511-12.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 512-13.
83. Id. at514.
84. Id. at515.
85. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 405-06 (2002).
86. Id.
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seek any presently available relief.87
What distinguished Harbury from earlier cases was the Court's ex-
plicit acknowledgment that "the underlying cause of action and its lost
remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give
fair notice to the defendant. '88 Because the plaintiff failed to identify an
underlying cause of action, the defendants could only guess as to what the
unstated cause of action was and what the subsequent remedy should have
been. 89 Therefore, the Harbury Court added, or at least clarified, another
subtlety to the notice pleading standard: that "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief '90 must include some
explicit mention of the remedy itself in order for the complaint to be
deemed sufficient.91 Even in adding this nuance, Harbury encapsulated the
modem Supreme Court trend, beginning with Conley, of liberally reading
complaints to only require minimal notice to the defendant without also
requiring any substantial factual allegations. 92
IV. TWOMBLYAND ERICKSON: CONFLICTING DECISIONS?
In the summer of 2007, the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, the first of two cases it would decide that summer involving
Rule 8(a)(2). 93 The plaintiffs in Twombly were a putative class of plaintiffs
made up of subscribers to local telephone and Internet services 94 who al-
leged a cause of action for liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act, which
requires a "contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce. '95 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant corpo-
rations "engaged in parallel conduct" in order to inhibit the growth of
newly formed local competitors, and also made agreements together to
"refrain from competing against one another. '96 Therefore, like the Courts
in Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, the Twombly Court granted certiorari to
determine the proper pleading standard for a specific cause of action-here,
a pleading for antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.97
87. Id.
88. Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at418.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
91. 536 U.S. 403.
92. See Harbury, 536 U.S. 403; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
93. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
94. Id. at 1962.
95. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
96. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1962.
97. Id. at 1963.
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In first addressing the question of whether the anticompetitive conduct
in question arose from independent decisions or from some type of collabo-
rative agreement among the defendants, the Court held that "[w]hile a
showing of parallel business behavior is admissible circumstantial evi-
dence ... it falls short of conclusively establishing agreement or itself con-
stituting a Sherman Act offense." 98 The Court then proceeded to analyze
how exactly to square the requirements it established for a claim under the
Sherman Act with Rule 8(a)(2).
Like other Courts before it, the Twombly Court noted that Rule 8(a)(2)
only requires "a short and plain statement of the claim" 99 in order to pro-
vide the "defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests." 100 However, the Twombly Court then differed from
the trend of its predecessors of accepting any complaint that provided no-
tice by stating that while a complaint does not need detailed factual allega-
tions, a plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." 101
The Court further added that Rule 8(a)(2) requires a "showing" rather than
a "blanket statement" demonstrating entitlement to relief and that a claim-
ant would simply be unable to provide fair notice and the grounds on which
a claim rests without at least some factual allegations in the complaint. 1
02
Thus, the Twombly Court held that the plaintiffs' allegation of parallel
conduct and bare assertion of conspiracy would not, without facts support-
ing the existence of a conspiracy agreement, withstand a motion to dis-
miss. 103 The Court made a special note saying that it was "one thing to be
cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of discov-
ery ... but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can
be expensive." 104 Going further, and unlike previous Courts' decisions,
Twombly suggested that
it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level sug-
gesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous
expense of discovery in cases with no reasonably founded hope that the
discovery process will reveal relevant evidence. 105
Therefore, it appeared that the Court in Twombly, like Judge Pos-
98. Id. at 1964 (internal quotation omitted).
99. FED R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
100. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964 (internal quotation omitted).
101. Id. at 1965.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1966.
104. Id. at 1966-67.
105. Id. at 1967 (internal quotations omitted).
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ner, 106 focused on the cost of discovery rather than following the "liberal
ethos"'1 07 favored by the drafters of the Federal Rules.
However, the Twombly Court also expressly (and sua sponte) abro-
gated some of the fifty year old language from Conley,108 which some be-
lieved to strike the "death-knell" for notice pleading. 109 The Twombly
Court revisited the "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state
a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of its claim which would entitle him to relief' 10 language
from Conley and stated that this language "can be read in isolation as say-
ing that any statement revealing the theory of the claim will suffice unless
its factual impossibility may be shown from the face of the pleadings."'' 1
Given this reading of the "no set of facts" language from Conley, the
Court in Twombly determined that "a wholly conclusory statement of claim
would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the
possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of [undisclosed]
facts to support recovery."11 2 Therefore, the ruling in Twombly was that the
"no set of facts" phrase "is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss
on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately,
it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allega-
tions in the complaint."'"13
In looking at the complaint in Twombly, the Court noted that the
pleadings did not mention a "time, place, or person involved in the alleged
conspiracies," nor did it indicate which of the defendant corporations were
involved in the anti-competition agreement. 114 Therefore, the Court held
that "nothing contained in the complaint invests either the action or inac-
tion alleged with a plausible suggestion of conspiracy [or] ... anything
more than the natural, unilateral reaction of each ILEC intent on keeping its
regional dominance."115
In the same vein as the Court in Swierkiewicz and Leatherman, the
Twombly Court noted that it was not applying any "heightened pleading
standard," nor did it "seek to broaden the scope of Federal Rule of Civil
106. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
107. Marcus, supra note 21, at 439.
108. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1969.
109. Marty Lederman, Is Twombly the Death-Knell for Notice Pleading?, SCOTUs BLOG, May 24,
2007, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/is-twombly-the-death-knell-for-notice-pleading/.
110. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,45-46 (1957).
111. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1968.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1969.
114. Id. at 1970-71 &n.10.
115. Id. at 1971.
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Procedure 9, which can only be accomplished by the process of amending
the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation." 116 Unlike certain
causes of action, which Rule 9117 requires plaintiffs to allege with particu-
larity, the Court did not feel as though the claim in Twombly needed such a
heightened pleading standard because there was no risk of abusive litiga-
tion inherent in an antitrust claim. 18 Instead of being "insufficiently par-
ticularized,.. . the complaint warranted dismissal because it failed in toto
to render plaintiff s entitlement to relief possible."" 19 Still, some academics
felt as though the decision "signal[ed] the rejection of notice pleading" or
that "the Court [was] saying that Rule 8 requires 'notice-plus' pleading."' 120
Still others dismissed the case as "quite insignificant" and posited that
"Twombly does not turn away from notice pleading."' 121
Dissenting Justices Stevens and Ginsburg agreed with the former set
of academics in viewing the majority's decision as a "dramatic departure
from settled procedural law," and noting that one of the majority's main
concerns seemed to be the high cost of antitrust litigation. 122 However, the
dissent felt as though "[t]he potential for sprawling, costly, and hugely
time-consuming discovery is no reason to throw the baby out with the
bathwater."' 123 The dissenting Justices believed that the plaintiffs in
Twombly had at least provided "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' in their complaint. 124 There-
fore, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg determined that the majority decision
was either contrary to the modern notice pleading trend established by over
a half-century of Supreme Court precedent, or that, in spite of its insistence
to the contrary, the majority was creating a heightened pleading standard
for the plaintiffs' claim. 125
If the Court's position on notice pleading seemed uncertain after
Twombly, the Court's decision two weeks later in Erickson v. Pardus left
nothing up to interpretation. 126 In Erickson, the petitioner was a pro se
prisoner whose complaint alleged that prison officials wrongfully termi-
116. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1973 n.14 (internal quotations omitted).
117. SeeFEDR.Civ.P.9.
118. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1973 n.14.
119. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
120. Amy Howe, More on Yesterday's Decision in No. 06-7317, Erickson v. Pardus, SCOTUS
BLOG, June 5, 2007, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/more-on-yesterdays-decision-in-no-
06-7317-erickson-v-pardus/#more-5535.
121. Id.
122. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1975 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 1987 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
125. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1984 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007).
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nated his hepatitis C treatment, which threatened his life and violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by showing "deliberate indifference to his seri-
ous medical needs."' 127 The prison officials took Erickson off of his treat-
ment because they believed that he had been using drugs, which would
render his treatment ineffective. 128
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed
Erickson's complaint on the ground that it failed to allege either that the
prison officials' actions caused him any substantial harm, or that the prison
officials had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. 129 The Tenth Circuit
affirmed, holding that Erickson had only made conclusory allegations in his
complaint and that he had failed to show any harm (much less substantial
harm) as a result of the discontinued treatment. 130
The Supreme Court's opinion was both concise and straightfor-
ward. 131 With little to no in-depth analysis, the Court reversed the Tenth
Circuit's decision as a stark departure from the "pleading standard man-
dated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."' 132 The Court then notably
cited Twombly in stating that "[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the state-
ment need only give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests." 133 After noting that Erickson's complaint
stated that the prison doctor's decision to remove Erickson from his treat-
ment endangered his life, and that Erickson was taken off the treatment
while he still had a need for it, the Court simply held that "[t]his alone was
enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)."' 134 Ultimately, and without ever deciding
whether Erickson's complaint was sufficient in all respects, the Court
stated that the "case cannot ... be dismissed on the ground that petitioner's
allegations of harm were too conclusory to put these matters at issue." 135
V. THE FUTURE OF NOTICE PLEADING
In light of these two decisions, the question is then what effect, if any,
did the decision in Erickson have on the decision in Twombly? The fact that
Erickson undeniably follows a simple notice pleading standard sheds light
127. 127 S.Ct. at 2197-98.
128. Id. at 2198.
129. Id. at 2199.
130. Id. (explaining that discontinuing the treatment after eighteen months because of his suspected
drug use put Erickson at no greater risk "than what he already faced from Hepatitis C itself.").
131. See Erickson, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007).
132. Id. at 2198.
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onto the seemingly revolutionary decision in Twombly to depart from that
standard and return, to some degree, to a fact pleading standard. However,
in order to fully understand the purpose of Erickson, it is first necessary to
look at the timing of the two decisions.
Erickson was first distributed to the Court for conference in early
January 2007, but the Court delayed decision on the petition for certiorari
for several months by calling for the respondent prison officials to respond
to the complaint and also calling for a copy of the record. 136 The docket
reflects that the record was received by the Court on March 7, 2007, and
yet there was no further action in the Erickson case until May 10, 2007, just
eleven days prior to the release of the Twombly opinion, when it was dis-
tributed for conference.1 37 Erickson was then relisted three times before the
opinion was finally released, two weeks after the release of the Twombly
decision. 138
Considering that the Court initially received Erickson in early January
2007, it seems unlikely that the Court would wait until June to release such
a straightforward opinion without having good reason for the delay. The
Court's decision in Erickson was simple and clear-cut; all the petitioner
needed to do was to draft a complaint so as to provide the defendant with
notice as required by Rule 8(a)(2). 139 Furthermore, Erickson was a pro se
plaintiff, so his complaint likely presented the bare minimum of what the
Court was willing to accept in terms of simple notice pleading. If even
Erickson's sparse complaint was enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), then the
Erickson decision alone would serve as a clear restatement of the trend
toward simplified notice pleading that the Supreme Court had followed
since Conley in 1957.
Yet, Erickson did not stand on its own. The Erickson decision was de-
layed until just after Twombly was decided precisely because it was such a
clear-cut opinion. The pro se petitioner's simple complaint, and the
straightforward ruling that the Court knew it would make, made Erickson
the perfect vehicle to follow the decision in Twombly, which was neither
straightforward nor in line with the trend requiring simple notice pleading.
The question is then what the Court tried to accomplish in Twombly and
why it was necessary to delay the decision in Erickson to counteract any
misconceptions about the notice pleading standard that the Justices be-
lieved Twombly would cause.
136. Howe, supra note 120.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See 127 S.Ct. 2197.
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Despite the Twombly majority's assertion that it was not creating a
heightened pleading standard, 140 the Twombly decision, as suggested by
dissenting Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, did exactly that. 141 It seems
counterintuitive that a majority of the Supreme Court would decide a case
like Twombly that could even appear to go against the notice pleading trend
that had appeared so consistent from Conley through Swierkiewicz (where
the Court specifically declined the opportunity to create a heightened
pleading for employment discrimination claims). 142 At the same time, the
decision is not surprising if one compares the reasoning in Twombly with
the resistance shown to the simple notice pleading trend in some of the
lower federal courts.
Spurred by the "liberal ethos" of Dean Clark and the drafting commit-
tee for the Federal Rules, the first Supreme Court cases to adopt the general
notice pleading trend, such as Conley, preferred to have a trial where facts
came out through discovery rather than in the complaint itself.143 Resis-
tance to this trend first arose not in the Supreme Court, but in the lower
federal courts, with individuals such as Judge Posner1 44 and Judge
Boudin 145 addressing their concerns that the rising costs of federal litiga-
tion would make it impractical to wait for facts to come out in an increas-
ingly expensive discovery phase, when instead the facts could be alleged at
the pleadings stage.
The Twombly majority expressed similar concerns, for the first time at
the Supreme Court level, stating that it was "one thing to be cautious before
dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of discovery... but quite
another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expen-
sive." 146 And the Twombly majority did not stop there, but further noted
that it must require more than what the plaintiffs had alleged because it was
only then that they could "hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense
of discovery."'
147
The Twombly majority opinion thus presents a conflict within itself:
the majority did not want to create a heightened pleading standard and yet
the Court also wanted to require the plaintiffs to plead with greater particu-
larity-at least in the Twombly antitrust litigation-in order to avoid the
140. 127 S.Ct. at 1973 n. 14 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
141. See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
146. 127 S.Ct. at 1966-67.
147. Id. at 1967.
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rising costs of discovery. The majority was undoubtedly aware of the trend
within Supreme Court precedent, which had established a simple notice
pleading standard since the adoption of the Federal Rules, and so too must
it have been aware that its decision in Twombly would counteract that
trend. This awareness and the desire not to counteract such a pervasive
trend explain the majority's insistence that it was not establishing a height-
ened pleading standard in Twombly.
However, if the Court's only ruling had been that it was not establish-
ing a heightened pleading standard, then the plaintiffs' complaint in
Twombly would have been adequate under a simple notice pleading stan-
dard that would have required the case to proceed to discovery. Proceeding
past the pleadings stage would then have counteracted the majority's stated
goal of avoiding expensive discovery in antitrust litigation. Therefore, the
Twombly majority had to make a broader decision and hold that the plain-
tiffs' complaint was inadequate even though the majority was supposedly
not creating a heightened pleading standard. The majority was thus not
only aware of the trend in lower federal courts to avoid expensive discov-
ery at the expense of requiring heightened pleading, but also adopted that
trend for itself.
Still, the Court did not want to radically alter the established trend of
simple notice pleading, which could have happened if the Twombly deci-
sion were to stand on its own. Thus, the Twombly Court created a height-
ened pleading standard for the plaintiffs in that case, embracing the trend of
the lower federal courts and explaining its concerns about the rising costs
of discovery. However, rather than lighten the implications of this radical
departure from the well-established simple notice pleading trend within
Twombly itself, the Court did so with the Erickson decision.
Twombly then stands for the idea that a plaintiff in antitrust litigation
must plead with a certain amount of particularity to proceed past the plead-
ings stage, so as to ensure that there is enough of a substantial claim to
continue into the potentially expensive discovery phase. Erickson, decided
two weeks after Twombly, ensures that the implications of the Twombly
decision do not extend beyond the four corners of that opinion. Erickson,
because its adherence to the simple notice pleading trend was so clear cut,
limits the heightened pleading requirement to the specific plaintiffs in
Twombly, or perhaps to plaintiffs in antitrust litigation under § 1 of the
Sherman Act. In doing so, Erickson guarantees that the seemingly revolu-
tionary Twombly decision does not rebuke the modern trend of simple no-
tice pleading in which Rule 8(a)(2) does not require anything more than "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
20091
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relief'148
CONCLUSION
The history of pleading in the United States changed from a fact
pleading standard prior to the drafting of the Federal Rules in 1938 to a
notice pleading standard after the drafting of the Rules. This trend contin-
ues through the present day, and was particularly visible at the Supreme
Court level, beginning with the Court's decision in Conley v. Gibson and
continuing through the summer of 2007. However, at the same time, a re-
sistance to this trend developed in some of the lower federal courts, which
favored greater particularity in drafting complaints to ensure that the im-
portant facts would come out prior to discovery, hopefully acting as a coun-
termeasure to the rising costs of civil litigation, particularly during the
discovery phase.
The Twombly Court seemed to adopt the lower federal court's resis-
tance to the trend, creating confusion among academics as to whether the
decision had created a heightened pleading standard for antitrust litigation
or whether notice pleading had been abandoned all together in favor of the
fact pleading standard used prior to the drafting of the Federal Rules. How-
ever, the Court's straightforward the decision in Erickson two weeks after
Twombly shows that Twombly was meant to stand on its own and dismiss
the complaint of the specific plaintiffs in that case without departing from
the simple notice pleading trend. Whether Twombly created a heightened
pleading standard for other antitrust cases or for other types of cases in-
volving particularly costly discovery is yet to be seen, but the Court's clear-
cut affirmation of a simple notice pleading standard in Erickson assures the
legal world that Rule 8(a)(2) truly requires no more than "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."1
49
148. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
149. Id.
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